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guage of CPLR 3106(b) required the subpoena to be served,
whether the accountant was determined to be the defendant's agent
or a non-party witness, since by such service an agent or nonparty witness is given an opportunity to avail himself of his right
to move for a CPLR 3103 protective order.
It is now clear that the practitioner is required to comply with
the literal language of the statute in serving the subpoena as a
condition precedent to an examination of a non-party witness or
agent.
CPLR 3126: Penalties imposed for -non-compliancewith an order
to disclose.
CPLR 3126 imposes harsh penalties for failure to comply with
a disclosure order1 52 The harshness of these penalties has made
the courts reluctant to apply them. In Nomako v. Ashton,'5 3 the
court denied the plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's answer and,
instead, entered an order of dismissal, conditional upon non-compliance with the disclosure order, and compelled payment of plaintiff's court costs and attorney's fees. Thus, the court avoided
applying the more severe penalties imposed by CPLR 3126.
Cases subsequent to Nomako have seemingly approved of the
action taken by the first department. They have exercised judicial
restraint in applying the direct sanctions authorized under CPLR
3126.154 For example, in DiBartolo v. American & Foreign Ins.
Co.,'15 where the plaintiff failed to appear on an adjourned date,
the court refused to dismiss the complaint unconditionally. The
order did provide that if costs and counsel fees were paid within
twenty days and if the plaintiff appeared within a specified time,
the motion to dismiss would not be granted. Noting the recent
trend toward ordering this type of punishment for willful nondisclosure, the court reasoned that the action, though harsh, was
justified because:
W]e cannot altogether condone irresponsible action (or inaction) to
the detriment of a party properly attempting to bring an action through
disclosure to trial and the ultimate resolution of the issues involved 56
' 2 Vith regard to failure to disclose the court may issue such orders
as are just. This includes, but is not limited to, orders: (1) resolving the
issue to which the information sought is relevant; (2) prohibiting the
disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses;
(3) striking out pleadings or parts thereof; (4) staying proceedings; (5)
dismissing the action; (6) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party.
153 22 App. Div. 2d 683, 253 N.Y.S2d 309 (1st Dep't 1964).

154See 7B McKwNNEVs CPLR 3126, supp, commentary 76, 79 (1965).
25548 Misc. 2d 843, 265 N.Y.S2d 981 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1966).
2- Id. at 844, 265 N.Y.S2d at 983.
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It is also to be noted that the court in DiBartolo punished the
plaintiff even though defendant had not made a motion to compel
disclosure under CPLR 3124.257
Another recent case in the third department has also applied
similar penalties where the defendant willfully refused to comply
with disclosure orders in connection with an examination before
triaIJ. s However, it is to be noted that here the plaintiff had
moved to punish the defendants for contempt. In denying the
motion the court added that such motion may be renewed if more
drastic punishment is necessary to secure defendant's compliance
with the disclosure orders.159 Accordingly, the court ordered the
imposition of court costs and counsel fees, in addition to requiring
that the disclosure proceedings be continued. Although the court
indicated it would not adjudge the defendant to be in contempt,
it clearly stated that such remedy was available if future conduct
justified its use. 60
As a result of these cases, the courts now seem to be willing
to apply more stringent penalties for refusing to obey a court order
for disclosure. However, the question of whether the courts will
impose a contempt penalty for violation of CPLR 3126 remains
unanswered. Due to the heavy amount of litigation in this area,
it is to be expected that the question will soon be resolved.
ARTICLE 32-

AccELERATE

JUDGMENT

CPLR 3213: Defendant's failure to answer motion for summary
judgment does not allow a default judgment in
action prior to return date of motion.
As originally enacted, CPLR 3213 161 limited a defendant to
a twenty-day answering period subsequent to service of a summons
and notice of motion for summary judgment. Since such an inflexible time period was inconsistent with the variety of answering
151 CPLR 3103; Mostow v. Shorr, 44 Misc. 2d 733, 255 N.Y.S.2d 320
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964).
158 Warner v. Bumgarner, 49 Misc. 2d 488, 267 N.Y.S2d 825 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1966).
159 Id. at 493, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 830.

160 Ibid. One commentator believes that the remedy of contempt is available
under this section, 3 WmxNsTEIx, Koan & MILFr, Nv YoRx CiviL PRActicE
1r3126.06 (1965), whereas another believes that CPLR 3126 is "a preemptive statement of the remedies that may be sought for a party's failure
to disclose," 7B McK1.NNEY'S CPLR 3126, supp. commentary 76, 82
(1964), and that contempt is not available.
161 Originally CPLR 3213 provided: "When an action is based upon a
judgment or instrument for the payment of money only, the plaintiff may
serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary judgment and
the supporting papers in lieu of complaint, returnable at least twenty days
after service." (Emphasis added.)

